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INTRODUCTION
In recent years the focus of the aid effectiveness debate has moved away from the traditional saving and foreign exchange gap theories to the institutional and policy gaps (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) . This new literature emphasises on the importance of good policies as a precondition not only for the working of aid but also for aid allocation. Put in differently it is argued that aid is only effective, in promoting growth, in countries with good policy environments and, therefore, donors should target these countries with their aid. This argument was echoed loudly in the much-discussed Assessing Aid (World Bank 1998). However, Lensink and White (1999) and Hansen and Tarp (2000 and , among others, have questioned the above conclusions on several grounds, with Hansen and Tarp (2001) finding that the impact of aid on growth is not conditional on good policies. This debate in the literature remains unsettled.
One of the shortcomings of the aid-growth literature -the main focus of most aid effectiveness studies -is that it overlooks the fact that aid is given primarily to the government and therefore any macroeconomic impact will depend on the public sector fiscal behaviour (McGillivray, 1994; Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998; McGillivray and Morrissey, 2001; Mavrotas, 2002) . One area of the wider aid effectiveness debate has attempted to look at how foreign aid inflows affect recipient government fiscal behaviour. Two main approaches have been adopted in this literature. The first approach is uniquely concerned with fungibility, which arises if recipients have the ability to use aid for purposes other than those for which donors provided it. This issue has been discussed extensively in Assessing Aid where it is argued '…donors should take it for granted that their aid is fungible because that is the reality ' (World Bank, 1998, p.80 ).
Well-known empirical studies that deal with the issue of fungibility include Pack (1990 and , Khilji and Zampelli (1994) and Feyzioglu et al. (1998) . The second approach addresses the fiscal impact of aid in a much broader context. It goes beyond aid's impact on expenditure types to look at how other sources of revenue (tax and borrowing) are affected by these inflows. This area of research, known as the fiscal response literature, has received increasing attention since the seminal contribution of Heller (1975) . Studies such as Mosley et al. (1987) , Gang and Khan (1991) and more recently Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) , Ahmed (1999), Franco-2 Rodriguez (2000) , McGillivray (2000) and Mavrotas (2002) Finances, 1997) . The fiscal response model used in the paper differs significantly from those previously applied, in recognition of this fact, by identifying interaction between debt service expenditure and other fiscal aggregates, including aid. A further departure from previous research is that the model's parameters are estimated in a way which ensures that all estimates are consistent with the theoretical model. This important point, as it will become clear later, has been overlooked by most previous studies. A key finding of this paper is that a large part of foreign aid is used for public debt servicing rather than other areas of government expenditure. Another key finding is that aid inflows do not reduce the level of debt in Côte d'Ivoire; this conflicts with conventional wisdom that aid and debt are substitutes.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II outlines the fiscal response model used in this paper, highlighting its differences to previous such models.
In Section III, the model in the previous section is then modified to account for the debt issue. Section IV discusses data issues and the econometric method used in the estimation process. Section VI presents the results and their interpretations. Concluding remarks and policy recommendations are provided Section VII.
A FISCAL RESPONSE MODEL
Fiscal response studies assume that public sector decision makers are faced with the task of allocating resources among expenditure types subject to budgetary constraints. These decision makers are further assumed to behave as if they were a single individual with a well-behaved, homothetic preference map and with the following utility function:
where I G represents public investment expenditure, G is government consumption expenditure, T is tax and other recurrent domestic revenue, A is net foreign aid disbursements (comprising grants and net aid loans) and B is net borrowing from other sources. All variables are for period t. Equation (1) is that posited by Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) . Various representations of this equation have been used in the literature, with some studies, for example, disaggregating G into recurrent and socioeconomic consumption expenditure or A into grants and loans. The interest of the current study is in debt servicing. In (1) this variable will be imbedded within A and B, but will clearly require a separate treatment for countries with relatively high levels of debt servicing.
We therefore replace (1) with the following utility function:
where E is both government investment and consumption expenditure, D is public debt The standard approach in the fiscal response literature is to write the public sector utility function as a quadratic loss function, which assumes that decision makers set annual targets for each expenditure and revenue variable and consciously strive to achieve these targets. We see no reason to depart from this approach and therefore write (2) as follows:
where the starred variables represent exogenous targets and α i > o, ∀ i = 1, …, 5. Utility function (3) as defined above implies that each year the government sets its targets for G I , G, T, A, and B and maximises its utility by trying to achieve these targets and any deviation from these targets results in a loss in utility. It follows that (3) reaches a maximum at α 0 . A fuller discussion of the general form of (3) can be found in Binh and McGillivray (1993) , Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) and Mavrotas (2002) .
Broadly following Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) , the policy maker is assumed to maximise utility function (2) subject to the following budget constraints:
where 1 ρ , 2 ρ ,and 3 ρ are the proportions of taxes, aid, and borrowing allocated to debt servicing, respectively. Consequently, given that the model contains two categories of expenditure (E and D),
ρ − the proportions of tax, aid and borrowing directed towards public investment and consumption expenditure. Equation (4) is simply the government=s overall budget constraint which must always hold. The rationale for the inequality written in (5) is that there are external constraints which limit the manner in which the public sector in developing countries allocates revenues. The actions of donors or domestic interests cause the values of the ρs in (5) to be imposed on those involved in setting targets and allocating revenue, with there being no guarantee that targets can be met even though revenues may satisfy (4). In other words, on the assumption that (5) is binding (the possible value of D is upper bound), these external constraints prevent the attainment of α 0 because at least one expenditure target cannot be met. Our analysis is premised on this assumption. If (5) is not binding the government is able to reach its expenditure targets, utility is maximised subject to (4) only and the government can attain α 0 if revenues are sufficient.
As is the tradition in practically all fiscal response studies we assume ex ante that targeted domestic borrowing B * , albeit gross borrowing in the present case, is equal to zero. Maximising (3) subject to (4) and (5) with B * = 0 yields the following system of structural equations:
1 A useful extension of the model, ruled out on the grounds, is disaggregation of the aid variable following Mavrotas (2002) . (1 )
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Solving the system of structural equations (6)- (10) 
where the δs are combinations of ρs , from equation (5) and αs from utility function written in (3). The coefficients of interest are those relating the total impact of aid on the endogenous variables. The composition of these coefficients is as follows: In the second stage of the estimation, the structural equations (6)- (10) The response to these two estimation issues is straightforward. One can simply impose the theoretical restrictions during estimation, as most econometric software packages permit. The ρs were restricted to lie between the range of zero and one and the βs were restricted to be equal to or greater than zero. Failing to impose these restrictions can lead to seriously misleading conclusions, as is shown below. 2
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
Results obtained from estimating the structural equations, with restrictions imposed, are shown in Table 1 . As it can be seen from this What is more, contrary to the studies of Griffin (1970) , Boone (1996) , and more recently (World Bank 1998), which argue that much foreign aid is used to finance government consumption, the estimate of 2 ρ also indicates that debt servicing and not consumption is main destination of aid funds. This finding confirms earlier results by Pack and Pack (1993) who found that around 88 cents per dollar of aid is used for debt servicing in the context of The Dominican Republic. 
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Estimates of the structural equations without restrictions imposed are shown in Table 2 .
Two of the three ρs and three of the βs are negative, and very different conclusions would emerge from these results regarding the impact of aid and the interaction of the fiscal variables in general. The approach of imposing restrictions on the non-linear three stage least squares estimation would therefore seem justified. The estimates of the i β s do not have a straightforward interpretation, but they allow us to determine the estimates of the structural equations when combined with the i ρ s. service. Aid appears to have a small negative direct incremental impact on government expenditure. With regard to tax and borrowing, results in Table 3 indicate that aid inflows discourage taxation efforts, and that the government substitutes borrowing for aid on a one-to-one basis. [ (1 ) ]
The fiscal response model can also be used to assess the impacts of domestic and other revenues, gross borrowing in this case, on public sector fiscal aggregates. From Table 3 it follows that the direct impacts of increases in borrowing are a reduction in debt servicing and an increase in government expenditure. This is another indication that the Ivorian government borrows to finance government expenditure and not to service its debt. Turning to taxation the evidence shows that an increase in borrowing is compensate by a decrease in taxation. Aid disbursements, on the other, barely respond to changes in borrowing. With regard to the direct impact of taxes the results show that increases in taxes are offset by decreases in borrowing. What is more, borrowing decreases by more than the increase in taxation, thus implying increasing taxation effort would help cut borrowing considerably. Borrowing and taxation affects each other by almost the same magnitude, thus implying the Ivorian authorities would substitute one for the other.
As mentioned earlier, the results related to the structural equations only show the direct, and therefore partial, impacts of the revenue variables on each endogenous variable.
Total impacts are captured by the estimates of the reduced form equations. Table 4 shows reduced form equation parameters relating to the total impact of aid, our prime interest. 3 These parameters suggest that the total impact of a 1000 CFA franc increase in aid is a 340 francs increase on debt servicing, thus confirming the above finding that part of the aid to Côte d'Ivoire is used to reduce the debt burden. Government expenditure does not appear to increase following increases in aid inflows. Turning to taxation and other recurrent revenue, the results indicate that, for every 1000 francs increase in aid revenue would fall by 920 francs. Given that the reduction in revenue is greater than the reduction expenditure it can be deduced that the total impact of aid on public saving is negative. Judging from the estimate of the total impact of aid on borrowing it is clear that contrary to the general belief, aid inflows do not lead to a reduction in borrowing.
Similar findings are reported by Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) One of the key findings of this paper is that a large proportion of aid to Côte d'Ivoire is used for debt servicing. This may be one of the reasons why many aid effectiveness studies have failed to establish a strong relation between aid and growth. Turning to taxation, aid seems to induce decrease in taxation effort and worse a decrease in public savings. Nonetheless, this decrease in public savings may be offset by an increase in private savings, as the reduction in taxes could benefit the private sector. Another finding of this paper is the fact that aid does not appear to induce reduction in borrowing. Most borrowing, it was found, is used to finance government expenditure on investment and consumption.
The policy recommendation of this paper, based on the above evidence, is given that the debt burden pulls resources (aid in particular) away from domestic expenditure (including investment) donors should help Côte d'Ivoire and other HIPCs in alleviating the burden in order to make aid work more effectively. One solution to the problem would be to allocate aid (in the form of more grants) not on the ground of good policy environment, as argued by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Assessing Aid, but relative to the size of debt burden. This could help developing countries grow out of their debt.
Another solution could be the expansion of developing countries' exports revenues through the adoption of fair trade policies by the advanced countries. Finally, debt forgiveness could also be a useful tool in helping the poor countries in removing the constraints imposed by debt servicing on the domestic economy.
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